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The provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (‘the Act’) relating to children and young 
people came as no surprise to those with academic and professional interests in youth justice and 
crime prevention, such provisions being based on measures previously outlined in the White 
Paper, No More Excuses - A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales,1 
and in the Audit Commission’s Report, Misspent Youth, Young People and Crime.2 However, the 
scope and significance of those provisions may have escaped more general notice, partly  
because the title does not suggest a focus on children and young people and also because debate, 
in Parliament and the media, in the weeks immediately before the Act received the Royal Assent 
on 31 July 1998, was dominated by controversy around an amendment, which was not enacted, 
to lower the age of consent for homosexual sex from 18 to 16 years.3
The Act as a whole provides new court orders  relating to the prevention and punishment 
of crime and disorder, amends the criminal law and revises aspects of the youth and adult 
criminal justice systems. However, the Act’s title does not give any indication that so many of 
 
1 Cm 3809 (London: Stationery Office, 1997). This White Paper was itself based on 
consultation documents issued by the Government when in Opposition and during its first six 
months in power. See, for example, Safer communities, safer Britain, Labour’s proposals for 
tough action on crime (London: Labour Party, 1995); J. Straw and A. Michael Tackling Youth 
Crime: Reforming Youth Justice, A consultation paper on an agenda for change, (London: 
Labour Party, May 1996) and Community Safety Order, A Consultation Document (London: 
Sentencing and Offences Unit, Home Office, September 1997).    
2 London: Audit Commission, 1996. 
3 This proposed reform was part of a new clause 1 which had been passed in the House of 
Commons by a majority of 207 on 22 June 1998 but was rejected in the House of Lords 
on 22 July by a majority of 168 and dropped by the Government in order to ensure the 
passage of the Act: see R. Swade ‘The Crime and Disorder Bill, The Age of Consent 
Debate’ (1998) 148 Childright 6.  
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the Act’s provisions are aimed at minors. Family lawyers, for example, may only now be noting 
that the Act has provisions which, when implemented,4 will make new orders available to the 
Family Proceedings Court.  Indeed, one might argue that if the Act had been entitled the 
‘Children and Young Persons’ Act’ that would not have been so very misleading, given the focus 
of such a large proportion of the Act5 on those under 18 years of age.6 The many provisions of 
the Act relating to children and young people have the potential, as had the Children Act 1989, 
for changing professional philosophies for working with children and families and for 
influencing how we ‘see’ children. 
 
Targeting children and young people 
Of obvious importance is the abolition, in section 34, of the rebuttable presumption that a child 
over 10 years of age is doli incapax - a presumption  previously applying to 10-13 year olds.7 
Provisions in the Act relating to, for example,  racially aggravated offences (in sections 28-33) 
are, therefore, potentially relevant to children over 10.8 Furthermore, the Act creates  a new order 
 
4 Pilots for child safety orders began in selected areas on 30 September 1998 and will run 
for 18  months with the aim of national implementation 2000-2001.  
5 As V. Baird points out, ‘there are youth-related measures in all five parts of the Act’ 
(‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998: introduction and new preventative orders in youth 
justice’ (1998) Legal Action October 15, 15).   
6 The Act uses  the previous statutory definitions of ‘child’ as under 14 and ‘young person’ 
as 14 and under 18 (s 117).  
7 See, for a discussion, S. Bandali ‘Abolition of the Presumption of Doli Incapax and the 
Criminalisation of Children’ (1998) 37(2) Howard Journal 114.   
8 Those sections of the Act which relate to new sex offender orders (ss 2-3 for England and 
Wales and s 20 for Scotland) and extended sentences for licence purposes for sex and 
violence offences (ss 58-60 and 86-88) might also apply to young people - given the 
extension of culpability in relation to sexual offences; see, for example, the Sex Offender 
Act 1997 s 4.  
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- the anti-social behaviour order - which is available to the courts in relation to anyone aged 10 
or over in England and Wales and aged 16 or over in Scotland.9 Drug treatment and testing 
orders will be available in both jurisdictions for those aged 16 or over.10  
There are also provisions relating specifically and exclusively to children and young 
people. Sections 11-15, dealing with child safety orders and child curfew schemes and notices, 
relate only to the under 10 year olds; section 16, allowing the removal of truants to designated 
premises, relates to children and young persons of compulsory school age; parenting orders are 
triggered when a child or young person is the subject of one of a range of orders or is convicted 
of an offence.11 In addition there are provisions relating to the setting up of statutorily based 
systems to ‘process’ children and young people who offend: sections 65-66 set up a new system 
of reprimands and final warnings to replace police cautions, sections 37-42 provide a statutory 
framework for a youth justice system with services, plans and inter-agency teams, and a national 
Youth Justice Board is set up by section 41 and schedule 2.12 Existing provisions for remands 
and committal of children and young people are amended by sections 97 and 98, the court’s 
ability to take account of the accused’s silence at trial is extended down to 10-13 year olds13 and, 
 
9 By ss 1 and 19, respectively. None of the provisions in the Act relate to Northern Ireland 
except certain of the provisions abolishing the death penalty for treason and piracy (s 36). 
10 ss 61-4 and 89-95; schedules 4 and 6. 
11 Sections 8-10 deal with parenting orders: section 8(1) lists the relevant orders as a child 
safety order, an anti-social behaviour order (created by s 1 of the Act) and a sex offender 
order (created by s 2 of the Act). In addition a parenting order can be triggered by the 
child failing to comply with a school attendance order under ss 443-444 of the Education 
Act 1996 (s 8(1)(d) of the Act) and by a criminal conviction (s 8(1)(c) of the Act).    
12 The Act also provides time limits within the prosecution process for the under 18 year 
olds (s 44) and amends the powers of youth courts (ss 47-8).  
13 Section 34 of the Act amends s 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 by 
removing the words ‘who has attained the age of fourteen years’ from s 35(1) and by 
deleting all of s 35(6).  
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for those found guilty of offending, the courts will have additional or re-named sentencing 
options: a reparation order,14 an action plan order15 and a detention and training order,16 together 
with new sanctions (under sections 72 and 77) for breach of supervision requirements.  
On the other hand, very few sections of the Act relate explicitly and exclusively to 
‘grown-ups’. The abolition, by section 51 and schedule 3, of committal proceedings for 
indictable only offences relates to ‘an adult’; section 99, which inserts a new section into the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 and thereby amends powers to release short term prisoners on licence, 
relates to those ‘aged 18 or over’ though the new section 34A(5)(a) gives the Home Secretary the 
power to repeal the words ‘aged 18 or over’. Those sections of the Act which are not explicitly 
aimed at children and young people are nearly all17 concerned with sexual and violent 
offenders,18 offenders dependent on drugs19 and offenders motivated by race.20   
In relation to adults, and those younger citizens who are brought within the scope of that 
 
14 Sections 67-8. Alternatively, under s 71, the court can impose a reparation requirement in 
a supervision order.  
15 Sections  69-70 and schedule 5. 
16 Sections 73-9. For a discussion of these new orders in the context of the current use of 
the Children and Young Persons’Act 1933 s 53(2) and (3), see C. Ball ‘R v B (Young 
Offenders: Sentencing Powers): Paying due regard to the welfare of the child in criminal 
proceedings’ (1999) 10(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 417-424.   
17 The exceptions to this generalisation include amendments to police powers of seizure (ss 
24, 26-27), powers to remove masks (s 25), bail conditions and restrictions (ss 54-56), 
the abolition of the death penalty for treason and piracy (s 36), sentencing guidance (ss 
80-1)  and the ‘toughening up’ of penalties for failure of compliance by football 
spectators with reporting restrictions under s 16(5) of the Football Spectators’ Act 1989 
(s 84).  
18 See ss 2-4 and 20-22 (sex offender orders) and ss 58-60 and 86-88 (sentences extended 
for licence purposes for sexual and violent offenders).  
19 See ss 61-64 and 82-95 and schedules 4 and 6 (drug treatment and testing orders).  
20 See ss 28-33 (racially aggravated offences) and ss 82 and 96 (sentencing increases for 
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term, the Act is, therefore, concerned with what have become, in legislation over the last two 
decades, ‘the usual suspects’: those offenders who are perceived as the most ‘dangerous’ to 
society at this point in time21  because they are sexually or physically violent, use or traffic in 
drugs or threaten the stability of a multi-racial society.22 In this context, an Act entitled ‘Crime 
and Disorder’ which concentrates to the extent this Act does on children and young persons is  
clearly endorsing those political and social ideas which emphasise the ‘danger’ of young 
people’s behaviour - the perceived threat from children ‘out of control’ and the potential threat to 
society if children are not guided into responsible and law-abiding adulthood.  
 
Images of children  
Such fears are, of course, not new:23 they have justified state intervention in factories and 
families since the early 19th century with a focus on one or both of those two categories of 
children labelled by the Victorians as the ‘depraved’ and the ‘deprived’.24 They have, however, 
 
racial aggravation).  
21 See J. Pratt ‘Governing the Dangerous: An Historical Overview of Dangerous Offender 
Legislation’ (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 21-36 for an analysis of changing 
conceptions of ‘dangerousness’.   
22 See, for example, the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 for 
provisions relating to violent, sex and drug offenders and the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
for the provision in ss 1 and 2 whereby those convicted of particular sexual and violent 
offences can be sentenced to ‘longer than normal’ terms of imprisonment.  
23 See, for example, G. Pearson Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears (London: 
Macmillan, 1983); H. Hendrick  Child Welfare, England 1872-1989 (London: Routledge, 
1994) especially ch 1; J. Eekelaar, R. Dingwall and T. Murray ‘Victims or Threats? 
Children in Care Proceedings’ (1982)  Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 68-82.  
24 See, for example, A. Morris and H. Giller Understanding Juvenile Justice (London: 
Croom Helm, 1987) ch 1; C. Piper ‘Moral campaigns for children’s welfare in the 
nineteenth century’ in M. King (ed) Moral Agendas for Children’s Welfare (London: 
Routledge, 1999) ch 3.  
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currently been amplified by a particular ‘politicisation’ of law and order25 whereby, according to 
von Hirsch and Ashworth, ‘popular resentment’ about crime has been exploited by both right and 
centre left political parties and governments in successfully ‘garnering political support’:26  
‘What is different about “law and order” in the 1980s and 1990s  is the stridency of the appeals 
to fear’.27 An example of such an appeal can be found  in Jack Straw’s Labour Party report of 
April 1996 entitled Tackling disorder, insecurity and crime, which begins;  
 
 
25 The politicisation of criminal justice policy as such is not novel: it has, for example,  
occurred from time to time in relation to juvenile justice from at least the 1960s onwards: 
see J. Pitts The Politics of Juvenile Crime (London: Sage, 1988).    
26 A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth ‘Law and Order’ in  A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth 
(eds) Principled Sentencing (2nd Ed.) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998)  410, 413-414.  
27 ibid 411. 
There is a rising tide of disorder which is blighting our streets, parks, town and city 
centres and neighbourhoods. .... Disorder has been all too often ignored. ... yet it has 
profound effects on individuals who feel frightened and unsafe: it can help to tip whole 
areas into decline, economic dislocation and crime; it can undermine the commercial 
viability of town and city centres.  
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The fears engendered have increasingly focussed on the young in the 1990s, despite unclear  
statistics about juvenile offending trends28 and despite the fact that the death of James Bulger in 
1993 - which intensified concern and led to calls for toughter penalties for young offenders -  
was unrepresentative of youth crime.29 But, as Diduck argues, ‘Moral concern [for children] can 
easily turn to moral condemnation, particularly in a political context in which the rhetoric of 
morality trips off the tongues of both the new right and the new labour communitarianism’.30 
According to Littlechild one can pinpoint when this occurred: ‘It is possible to put a date on the 
genesis of the new punitive policies in the youth justice system: at the time when the police and 
the media were on the hunt for the rat boy, bail bandits and ram raiders; and when the 
Conservative Party was low in the opinion polls’.31 For the same political reason, there began in 
 
28 See B. Littlechild ‘Young offenders, punitive policy and the rights of children’ (1997) 
17(4) Critical Social Policy 73-92, 78-9; M. Hill and K. Tisdall Children and Society 
(London: Longman, 1997) 178-180.  
29 Venables and Thompson (the two boys convicted in this case) were sentenced  under the 
 Children and Young Persons’ Act 1993 s 53(1) which provides for  the equivalent of a 
life sentence. The sentencing powers available were, therefore, adequate though whether 
it is adequate to deal with children in the Crown Court is another issue.   
30 A. Diduck ‘Justice and childhood: reflections on refashioned boundaries’ in M. King 
(1999) n 24 above, ch 8.  
31 n 28 above, 77. 
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1996 ‘what seemed to be like a Dutch auction of who could seem to be most tough in relation to 
young people’.32  
 
 
32 ibid 80.  
The responsible child 
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What has emerged - sometimes in contradiction, as we shall see, to the smaller print of policy 
documents - is a particular image of the young offender which concentrates on the personal 
responsibility of the child or young person for his or her offending. Tackling Youth Crime, 
having outlined the proposed reforms which are now in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, made 
the new approach clear: ‘Changes of this kind ... would represent a move away from 
preoccupation with legal processes to one of confronting young offenders with their 
behaviour’.33 Straw, as Home Secretary, re-iterated this theme in No More Excuses:   
 
An excuse culture has developed within the youth justice system. It excuses itself for its 
inefficiency, and too often excuses the young offenders before it, implying that they 
cannot help their behaviour because of  their social circumstances. Rarely are they 
confronted with their behaviour and helped to take more personal responsibility for their 
actions.34  
 
According to this White Paper, ‘Children above the age of criminal responsibility are generally 
mature enough to account for their actions and the law should recognise this’.35  They are, 
therefore, deemed mature enough to respond to measures focussing on ‘nipping offending in the 
bud’:36  
 
33 Straw and Michael, n 1 above, 12.  
34 White Paper, n 1 above, Preface by Home Secretary. 
35 ibid Introduction 
36 ibid Preface: ‘We are determined to cut waste in the present Youth Justice System as 
identified by the Audit Commission last year. Instead we will refocus resources and the 
talents of professionals on nipping offending in the bud, to prevent crime from becoming 
a way of life for so many young people’. 
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Many young people offend once or twice, often under the influence of their peers. The 
challenge is to nip that behaviour in the bud and to prevent further criminality ... a range 
of community sentences must be provided in every area to prevent the first time offender 
from developing into a repeat offender’.37
 
This ‘no-excuse’ culture and the constitution of children and young people as sufficiently 
responsible and mature to be held to account has also allowed restorative justice to re-emerge as 
a legitimate option in relation to offending by minors. Mediation and reparation projects 
established and researched within the juvenile and criminal justice systems in the 1980s had 
revealed more difficulties than advantages. By 1992 Davis had concluded, ‘It is rare for a set of 
ideas to catch on as quickly as did the enthusiasm fo victim-offender mediation and reparation in 
the UK in the mid 1980s ... It is now fair to say that, within government circles, mediation and 
reparation shemes constitute something of a “dead” subject’.38 The political need since 1992 to 
be seen to be  tackling youth crime, against a backdrop of criticisms of the current youth justice 
system, has given reparation a new lease of life. It is presented as a new, more positive means of 
 responding to offending by the young and, through its elements of blaming the offender whilst  
 
37 Safer communities, safer Britain, n 1 above, 6-7. 
38 G. Davis Making Amends: Mediation and Reparation in Criminal Justice (London: 
Routledge, 1992).  For schemes operating in the 1980s see, for example, H. Blagg 
‘Reparation and Justice for Juveniles’ (1985) 25 British Journal of Criminology 269-279; 
M. Wright and B. Galaway (eds) Mediation and Criminal Justice (London: Sage, 1989).  
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promoting reintegration into the community, appears to cross the punishment/protection divide.   
  
  Research undertaken within the social sciences is called in aid of these images and 
possibilities.  No More Excuses asserts in its Preface: ‘For too long we have assumed that young 
offenders will grow out of their offending if left to themselves. The research evidence shows this 
does not happen’ and paragraph 1.10 of that document39 accurately summarises recent Home 
Office research which shows that young men are now taking much longer to desist from 
offending and that those traditional indicators of ‘settling down’, such as marriage, no longer 
correlate with such desistance (though they are still operative in regard to young women).40 
However, that  research also shows that ‘offending amongst young people is widespread and ... 
most offenders commit no more than one or two offences,’ with 3% of such offenders counting 
for about a quarter of all offences,41 a finding distorted in the White Paper:  ‘For many young 
offenders it is true that their first caution - or court appearance - is enough to divert them from 
crime. But this assumption is wide of the mark when it comes to the hard core of persistent 
offenders who cause so much crime’.42 ‘Most’ has changed to ‘many’ and the focus of the 
message is on the ‘hard core’: measures and language suitable for a minority set the tone for the 
 
39 n 1 above.  
40 J. Graham and B. Bowling Young People and Crime HORS 145 (London: Home Office, 
1995). 
41 ibid 83 and 84. 
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majority.   
 
42 No More Excuses, n 1 above, para 1.9.  
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The dominant image of the young offender is, therefore, not of a child but of a (male) 
youth: sections 8-16 of the Act, dealing with parenting, child safety and curfew orders, all 
available for the under 10 year olds and two exclusively so, are entitled ‘Youth crime and 
disorder’. As the Bulger case  revealed, we find it difficult to conceptualise as ‘normal’ those 
children who offend - they become ‘evil monsters’ at one end of the spectrum and youth at the 
other43 and, if von Hirsch and Ashworth are right in their analysis of symbolic criminal justice 
politics,44 politicians have led, rather than followed, public opinion in these constructions. But 
that analysis also warns that there are ‘subspecies’ of such politics:  
 
One such subspecies seems to be a certain mixture of nostalgia and notions of ‘instilling 
discipline’, represented by measures such as curfews for young teenagers. The children 
involved are not necessarily characterised as vermin ... the idea, rather, seems to be the 
instillation of a certain ‘benevolent discipline’.45
 
That rather different image of a naughty child was evident in Tackling Youth Crime. Having 
summarised the now familiar message about the need for  young offenders ‘to be held to 
account’ the following statement is made: ‘All this is common sense. It is how people deal with 
unacceptable behaviour by children in a family setting or at school or on the sports field’.46  
Such homely comments have clear appeal: that they gloss over the known difficulties of 
 
43 See, for example, M. King A Better World for Children (London: Routledge, 1997), 
chapter entitled ‘The James Bulger trial: good or bad for guilty or innocent children?’.  
44 n 26 above, 419.  
45 ibid. 
46 1996, above n 1, 9.  
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substitute child care and control by state agencies is, therefore, a source of some concern. 
 
The vulnerable child 
These current dominant images of  the minor who offends or engages in ‘deviant’ behaviour - 
though by no means novel - are in contrast to other images which have underpinned  legislative 
provisions in the past. For example there has at times been an image of the child whose 
offending is viewed as an indicator of need - whether that need is in relation to social and 
economic conditions or personal behaviour difficulties. In the 1970s and 1980s policies of 
diversion from prosecution and from custodial sentences, developed under the influence of 
financial constraints and social science research and theory, were based on ideas about the 
deleterious effect of  labelling47 children as criminals and  the propensity for offending to be a 
stage in the development of  children. Such ideas are evident in the White Papers preceding the  
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and the Children and Young Persons’ Act 196948  and also in 
the provisions in the Children Act 1989 to impose duties on Local Authorities, in the context of 
children ‘in need’, to encourage children not to offend and to divert them from criminal 
proceedings.49   
 
47 See E. Lemert Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1967).   
48 Home Office The Child, The Family and the Offender Cm 3601 (London: HMSO, 1965); 
Home Office Children in Trouble Cm 274 (London: HMSO, 1968). 
49 Section 17 and schedule 2 para 7.  
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The dominant image of the young offender is also in contrast to images of children 
underpinning recent legislation relating to the family. For example, the Family Law Act 1996 
relies on an image of a vulnerable child harmed by parental conflict and violence and who needs 
protection from divorcing or abusive parents by state encouragement of mediation and remedies 
to remove abusers from the family home. Likewise, in the family justice system,  so strong is the 
image of the dependent, vulnerable child that court welfare officers are often reluctant to 
‘burden’ children with the opportunity to express their wishes and judges are reluctant to give 
leave to minors to make independent applications.50  Even when the child’s liberty is at stake in 
an application for her to be placed in secure accommodation under section 25 of the Children Act 
1989 the child has no right to be in court because it is deemed harmful for her.51
   
Child and community protection  
And yet there are passages in policy documents that would found a different image of the child 
or young person who offends and would  influence less punitive practice in relation to them. One 
such passage can be found in the Introduction to the recent Consultation Document Supporting 
Families:52 ‘First the interests of the child must be paramount. The Government’s interest in 
family policy is primarily an interest in ensuring that the next generation gets the best possible 
start in life’. Whilst this may be constituting childhood simply as preparation for adulthood it 
does concentrate on the child’s welfare. However, this is point 7, whereas point 1 gives a 
different message:  ‘Families are at the heart of society. ... Our future depends on their success in 
 
50 See chapters by J. Roche and C. Piper in S. Day Sclater and C. Piper (eds) Undercurrents 
of Divorce (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), ch 3 and ch 4, respectively.   
51 Re W (minor)(secure accommodation order: attendance at court) [1994] 2 FLR 1092.  
52 London: Home Office,  1998, 4. 
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bringing up children. That is why we are committed to strengthening family life’. The ambiguity 
as to whether the aim is to promote the child’s welfare per se or to protect adults is also evident 
in the Government’s apparent acceptance53 of the research which finds statistical correlations 
between the onset or persistence of offending and various factors concerned with family life, 
learning difficulties, unemployment and drug or alcohol use54 and its enacted ‘solutions’ which 
focus on final warnings and a range of court imposed orders. 
The Labour Government has, therefore, given mixed messages about the relationship 
between child and community ‘safety’. In Opposition the position appeared clear: ‘Ultimately the 
welfare needs of the individual young offender cannot outweigh the needs of the community to 
be protected from the adverse consequences of his or her offending behaviour’.55 In the White 
Paper this conflict is resolved differently: ‘Preventing offending promotes the welfare of the 
individual young offender and protects the public .... Preventing offending by young people is a 
key aim: it is in the best interests of the young person and the public’.56 So, using this version of 
best interests which trumps all other child welfare needs, the section on child safety and curfew 
orders can be headed ‘Protecting children under 10'.57   
 
Nevertheless, in Standing Committee,  the responsible Minister (Mr O’Brien)  stated; ‘ 
 
53 See, for example, No More Excuses, n1 above, ch 1. 
54 See, for example, and D. Utting, J Bright and C. Henricson Crime and the Family, 
Occasional Paper 16, (London: Family Policy Studies Centre, 1993) and M. Rutter, H. 
Giller and A. Hagell Antisocial Behaviour by Young People; The Main Messages from a 
Major Review of the Research (Knutsford: Social Information Systems Ltd, 1998) for 
reviews of such research.  
55 Straw and Michael, n 1 above,  9. 
56 n 1 above, paras 2.2. and 2.3.  
57 ibid, before para 5.2. 
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this Bill is concerned with protecting both the child and the community’ and  ‘The [child safety] 
order’s purpose will be to facilitate a balance’.58 Child protection has generally avoided such  
notions of balance though there are important exceptions. One of these59 is the Children Act 
1989 provision mentioned above which empowers the court to make a secure accommodation 
order.60 The criteria for that order include, in section 25(1)(b),  ‘likely to injure himself or other 
persons’ which creates a potential conflict between the interests of the community and the child 
 
58 HC Standing Committee B 7 May 1998 (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.199798/cmstand/b/st980507/pm/80507s08.htm and /80507s07.htm, respectively). 
59 Another example is part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 which deals with protection of 
children, spouses and cohabitees from domestic violence: the court, in deciding whether 
to exercise its discretion to make an occupation order, may have to balance the harm such 
an order would inflict on the respondent (or his child) against the harm the applicant (or 
her child) might suffer if an order were not made. See, for example, ss 33(7)(b) and  
36(8)(b).   
60 s 25, operating in relation to a child ‘looked after’ by the Local Authority, that is, in care 
under s 31 or accommodated under s 20 of the Children Act 1989. The scope was 
extended by the Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991 Regulation 7 to 
children accommodated by health authorities and trusts and in non-Local Authority 
residential care and mental nursing homes.  
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and has led to the exclusion of the principle that the welfare of the child should be paramount.61 
Whether the courts will be able to give sufficient weight to the child’s welfare in the  balancing 
exercise created by child safety orders is similarly problematic, a point made at length by the 
Opposition in Standing Committee. The Minister’s reply was not wholly reassuring:  
 
 
61 Re M (Secure Accommodation Order) [1995] 1 FLR 418. See C. Smith and P. Gardner 
for the difficulties caused by these conflicting aims:  ‘Secure Accommodation under the 
Children Act 1989: legislative confusion and social ambivalence’ (1996) 18(2) Journal 
of Social Welfare and  Family Law 173-187.  
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The Hon member for Hertsmere is correct in saying that the paramount consideration is 
for the care of the child. The orders will also allow consideration of the impact of the 
child’s behaviour, which could be damaging to its victims and to the wider community. 
Such behaviour could be damaging to the child, if there was no intervention to stop it.  ... 
As the trigger for a care order under the clause would be the child’s original behaviour 
followed by the breach of an order made under the Bill, the court would have to have 
regard to that, as well as to the care of the child. ... The child’s welfare would be 
neglected by our not stopping such behaviour.62
 
These attempts to conflate child and community safety raise a related issue, that of the 
separation or otherwise of the young ‘criminal’ from the young ‘victim’. The trend, since the 
failure to implement much of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969,63  has increasingly been 
to ‘process’ the child who offends through law and procedures quite separate from those relevant 
to the child in need of services or protection. This has occurred partly as a result of the punitive 
attitudes already discussed but also as a result of longer standing concerns to minimise state 
intervention in the lives of both groups of children and to set up appropriate procedures for them. 
Examples of this increasing separation are the repeal by the Children Act 1989 of the criminal 
offending condition for a care order64 and the division of the old juvenile court into separate 
Family Proceedings and Youth Courts by section 70 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The 
 
62  Standing Committee B, Mr Alun Michael, May 12 1998 (http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.199798/cmstand/b/st980512/am/st80512s01.htm).  
63 See, for example, R. Harris and D. Webb Welfare, Power and Juvenile Justice (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1987).  
64 Section 90 and schedule 15 of the Children Act 1989 repealed section 7(7) of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1969.  
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deprived and depraved are now normally responded to differently, there remaining very few 
pieces of legislation or sites65 which bridge the distinction between them. Child safety orders 
seem set to muddy the distinction.  
 
65 As mentioned above, the Children Act 1989 schedule 2 deals with the prevention of 
offending in the context of need, and admission to secure units can be by welfare (s 25 of 
the Children Act 1989) and criminal processes. 
That is not necessarily something to be criticised. Valid arguments for conflating the 
categories and not labelling the child who offends as ‘an offender’ per se have been put forward 
by politicians, juvenile justice practitioners and charitable bodies from time to time over at least 
200 years and have, occasionally, formed the dominant view.  However, those pursuing such an 
approach must develop practices which fully acknowledge the dangers such a blurring of 
distinctions can produce for the child and her family and formulate best practice accordingly. 
There are grounds for concern that this might not occur in relation to child safety orders.   
 
Fudging distinctions: the child safety order 
  
On the application of a local authority, the family proceedings court will be able to make a child 
safety order in relation to children under 10 years of age if  one or more of the conditions 
specified in section  12(3) are fulfilled:  
 
(a) that the child has committed an act which, if he had been aged 10 or over, would have 
constituted an offence; 
(b) that a child safety order is necessary for the purpose of preventing the commission by 
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the child of such an act as is mentioned in paragraph (a) above; 
(c) that the child has contravened a ban imposed by a curfew notice;66 and 
(d) that the child has acted in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself.  
 
66 Section 11(3)(c) will not be available for the courts until child curfew schemes have been 
authorised and become operational.  
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These are ‘fairly wide grounds’67 and  cover conceptually different scenarios. Conditions (a) and 
(b) reveal the political imperative to ‘deal with’ an ever younger category of (potentially) 
offending children.  Children over 10 will be  liable to reprimands, warnings and criminal 
proceedings in respect of  their offending, the under 10s may instead be the subject of a child 
safety order if offending (without the mens rea element) is proved (without the child having any 
right to separate representation) to the satisfaction of the court (on the balance of probabilities).  
 Conditions (c) and (d) appear to be targeted at the child who, in public spaces, is a 
nuisance or who is deemed to be in such places at unsuitable hours for a child. The fourth 
condition is identical  in its wording to part of section 1 of the Act. That section provides for 
anti-social behaviour orders for anyone over 10 years of age and includes a definition of acting in 
an ‘antisocial manner’: ‘that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress’.68 In effect, this means that a child safety order, imposed on this condition,  
amounts to an anti-social order for the under 10s. 
 
67 Mr Clappison, Standing Committee B 7 May 1998 (http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.199798/cmstand/b/st980507/pm/80507s08.htm). The Committee 
proposed to substitute the following for the first three grounds:  ‘that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the child’s behaviour indicates a serious risk of the child 
offending after he has attained the age of 10 and that making such an order is in the 
interests of preventing the child so offending’ (amendment 347). That amendment was 
not pressed to a division.    
68 s 1(1)(a) and replicated in s 11(3)(d).    
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The order is for a maximum period of 3 months69 and places the child under the 
supervision of a ‘responsible officer’ who can be a member of a local authority youth offending 
team (established under section 39) or a social worker in the social services department of a local 
authority70  and ‘requires the child to comply with such requirements as are so specified’.71 
Those requirements, set out in section 11(5), are any72 ‘which the court considers desirable in the 
interests of -  (a) securing that the child receives appropriate care,  protection and support and is 
subject to proper control; or (b) preventing any repetition of the kind of behaviour which led to 
the child safety order being made’. 
The Act, in contrast to the Family Law Act 1996  in section 11(4), does not impose its 
own welfare test or checklist, and so the welfare of the child will be paramount in proceedings to 
apply for these orders.73 The application must be made by a local authority and  the child will 
probably be supervised by a social work trained officer.  It may, therefore, be seen as alarmist to 
view such orders as heralding an Orwellian state.  However, this focus on offending to trigger a 
civil order -  without the child-friendly provisions built into the child protection process or the 
procedural safeguards built into the criminal process - is worrying.  For example, applications for 
child safety orders will not be ‘specified proceedings’ so a guardian ad litem will not be 
appointed for the child, nor is the child entitled to separate legal representation (because she is 
 
69 Unless the circumstances are ‘exceptional’ in which case the maximum is 12 months. 
70 ss 11(1)(a) and 11(8). 
71 Section 11(1)(b). 
72 Except that s 12(3) specifies that requirements which conflict with the parent’s religious 
beliefs and the child’s schooling should be avoided.     
73 As applications for child safety orders are family proceedings, the welfare test in the 
Children Act 1989 s 1 operates rather than the test in the Children Act 1933 s 44 (‘have 
regard to the welfare of the child or young person’) which operates in criminal 
proceedings. 
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not a party, nor are  they criminal proceedings).  Similarly, whilst the child safety order is 
essentially a supervision order (with requirements) it does not have the same safeguards built 
into its use. A supervision order is available within the family justice system via section 31 of the 
Children Act 1989 where the ‘significant harm’ threshold operates,74 and within the youth justice 
system under section 7(7)(b) of the Child and Young Persons Act 1969. The problem, as 
Childright has commented, is that ‘the extra care, protection and support’ which a child safety 
order might give to a child  may only be useful ‘so long as they are not branded as criminals and 
excluded from society’.75 Child safety orders could label and criminalise children to their 
detriment and bring  more children into youth justice and care systems when less draconian 
responses might be more appropriate. There is no requirement to consider (as in section 1(5) of 
the Children Act 1989) whether, even if the conditions have been satisfied, it is better for the 
child not to make an order and so it is not clear how the magistrates’ discretion in section 11(1) 
(‘may make and order’) will be exercised.    
 
74 Though it is fair to say that a s 31 order gives the Local Authority parental responsibility 
for the child (s 33(3)).   
75 The Children’s Legal Centre (1998) 143 Childright 8-9, 9. 
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Perhaps more serious, however, are the  implications for  the child (and for the coherence 
of family law) who fails to comply with any requirements included in a child safety order. The 
order can be varied or, alternatively, it can be discharged and a care order made in its stead under 
section 31(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989. Section 90(1) of the Children Act 1989 abolished the 
power to make care orders on an offence condition because, as Masson notes, ‘The offence 
condition ... did not fit in with the notion that a care or supervision order should only be made on 
proof of substantial harm’,76 and yet the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 explicitly states that  the 
significant harm test to be found in the section 31(2) of the Children Act does not have to be 
applied.77 Before the introduction of the Children 1989 there were at least 12 routes into care78 
and section 12 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 does  not technically alter the intention of the 
Children Act 1989 to establish only one route into care  but, by specifically excluding the 
necessary operation of the threshold test, in effect it does create a different route into care.79
The potential of the provision for child safety orders is that an instance of actual 
‘offending’ or the risk of such, the failure to ‘stay in’ between the hours of 9 pm and 6 am as 
specified by the terms of a curfew notice80  and instances of anti-social behaviour could all lead 
 
76 J. Masson Current Law Statutes Annotated Children Act 1989, 41-159.  
77 Section 12(7). 
78 P. Bromley and N. Lowe Bromley’s Family Law, 7th ed (London: Butterworths, 1992)  
440 et seq. 
79 Significantly, seven years before the partial repeal of s 7(7) of the Children and Young 
Person’s Act 1989 (see above)  a new sub-section has been inserted into that section  to 
enjoin on the courts its use only in relation to serious offending and only if the child was 
also ‘in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes a 
care order’ (s 7(7A) inserted by the Criminal Justice Act 1982 s 23). 
80 s 14(2); s 15(4) amends s 47 of the Children Act 1989 so that the Local Authority also 
has a duty to investigate the child’s welfare if informed that a curfew notice has been 
contravened.   
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to the imposition of conditions on a child and its family which, if not complied with, allow a 
court to by-pass that very test that was felt necessary in 1989 to reduce the incidence of the most 
severe form of state intervention in the family.  Furthermore, behaviour which falls short of 
offending (anti-social behaviour by anyone over or under 10, together with ‘offending’ or the 
risk of such by those under 10 deemed incapable of offending) can, therefore, potentially lead, 
depending on the child’s age and the original order,  to the removal of a child from his or her 
family either to be ‘looked after’ by the Local Authority or by HM Prison Service. 
 
The partnership context 
This ambiguity as to whether the primary aim is the promotion of the child’s welfare or crime 
prevention is of significance in relation to an important theme in the Act - that of inter-agency 
partnership. Under section 39 Local Authorities must set up youth offending teams,  and 
probation committees and police and health authorities must cooperate in such provision and in 
the making of youth justice plans for the area. In practice many such teams already exist, having 
developed ad hoc over the last decade or so and inter-agency partnerships are routine in child 
protection work.81 What undermines government assurances that community protection can be 
properly pursued without a reduced emphasis on child protection and support is that it has been 
seen as necessary to set up a new and separate partnership. Schedule 2 of Children Act 1989, 
together with the Children Act 1989 (Amendment) (Children’s Services Planning) Order 1996,  
requires the  local authority to produce and publish children’s services plans and such plans 
 
81 For government encouragement of partnership in probation practice see, for example, 
Partnership in Dealing with Offenders in the Community (London: Home Office, 1990) 
and Supervision and Punishment in the Community Cm 966  (London: HMSO, 1990). 
For such encouragement in relation to child protection see, for example, F. Kaganas, M. 
King and C. Piper (eds) Legislating for Harmony, Partnership under the Children Act 
1989 (London: Jessica Kingsley Publication, 1995). 
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should include provision for services to prevent offending behavour by children and young 
people. Yet a consultation paper issued in early 1998 by the Department of Health, entitled 
Working Together to Safeguard Children: New Government Proposals for Inter-Agency Co-
operation,82  did not mention youth offending. One could, therefore, argue that new ‘dedicated’ 
partnerships are necessary because crime preventative measures have not been given adequate 
priority and resources in children’s services plans83 but that could have been remedied. How  
children at risk of offending or who do offend are protected will depend at least partly on the 
nature of the partnership between the partnerships.  
How the new orders and processes provided by the Crime and Disorder Act 1989 are 
‘contextualised’,  resourced and marketed will, therefore, be crucial. If preventative measures  
are developed, presented and resourced as opportunities and services sufficiently widely 
available not to stigmatise and alienate then they are greatly to be welcomed. Similarly, if child 
safety, anti-social behaviour and parenting orders include requirements that provide child and 
family support rather than negative control they too can open up new avenues for helping childen 
and their families. Otherwise these measures  will simply provide different technical ways to 
draw children and families into youth justice and child protection systems which often do not  
improve their lives.  
 
82 London; Children’s Services Branch, Department of Health, February 1998.    
83 See Social Services Inspectorate/Department of Health Responding to Youth Crime: 
Findings from inspections of youth justice services in five local authority social services 
departments (London: HMSO, 1994); B. Hearn and R. Sinclair Children’s Services 
Plans, Analysing need: reallocating resources, (London: Department of Health, 1998).  
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One suspects that, as with the introduction of community service orders by section 14 of 
the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1970, the lack of penological and conceptual clarity is not an 
accident. The  Act can be all things to all people. It appears to legitimate much wider 
possibilities for victim-offender and community-offender reparation and encourages the sort of 
inter-disciplinery working that could allow the child to be seen as more than simply an offender. 
Yet these provisions sit alongside what is in effect a tariff-based, rather than child-centred,  
system of  reprimands and warnings  and alongside civil orders whose requirements for 
‘detention’ in the home could be increasing the dangers to a child. How youth justice 
professionals and magistrates  approach and use these orders and services will be a major 
determinant of outcome, given the inherent ambivalence in government policy.    
The proclaimed commitment of the Labour Party and Government to a two-pronged 
strategy in relation to young offenders is well known: ‘Both research and common sense indicate 
that there are links between social conditions and crime ... As well as tackling these underlying 
causes of offending, immediate action can be taken at a local level to reduce crime’.84 It would 
be a pity if the immediate action in the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1989 set the 
tone for professional and magisterial responses to children who offend. Terms such as risk, harm 
and safety are now ubiquitous concepts deployed in different policy areas but with different 
meanings and outcomes in each. There is a danger that the Act will contribute to the dominance 
of particular meanings whereby children’s rights and welfare are subsumed in community safety. 
If  that occurs, then it is doubtful whether the child, in experiencing the potentially  restrictive 
and controlling nature of  these new orders, will appreciate that he or she  is being ‘saved’ from a 
life of depravity.   
 
84 Safer communities, safer Britain, n 1 above 8.  
